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THE BATTERED CHILD:
LOGIC IN SEARCH OF LAW
INTRODUCTION
Willful child abuse resulting in what has been termed the bat-
tered child has received an increasing amount of attention in re-
cent years. While the problem is not unique to modern times, its
solution continues to challenge the minds of men in almost all the
professions of functioning society in the United States-including
medicine, law, the social sciences, education, and government. The
purpose of this article is to try to achieve some perspective on the
problem by analyzing significant aspects and to clarify the legal
issues so as to bring them closer to resolution.
Part of the problem involves identification of the battered child;
this part subsumes the problems of defining his characteristics, de-
termining the available persons for, and their impediments to, iden-
tifying him. It also implies a need to know the frequency of occur-
rence of abused children and understand the causes and correla-
tional factors which accompany them. Interrelated to identifica-
tion, yet distinct, is the process of prevention and remediation
through the law. In order to solve the problems and meet the is-
sues, which the legal framework has avoided, legal reform is nec-
essary.
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IDENTIFICATION OF THE BATTERED CHILD
What Is the Battered Child?
The main problem in defining the abused child is that there are
a number of ways of abusing a child' and the importance may de-
pend partly on the matter of degree or severity of the abuse.2 Gen-
erally, however, for matters of exposition and clarification in this
article, the medical interpretation of the battered child will be used.
The medical field coined the term "battered child syndrome" to
fit a particular pattern of physically correlated symptoms. 3 The
syndrome is relatively limited to severe physical injuries, although
a range of possible symptoms is broad and excludes the more nebu-
lous kinds of abuse which fall into areas of mental, social,4 and
emotional 5 development. 6 A 1963 cumulative report 7 of 662 dif-
1. While "[in]any children are deprived of sufficient food, clothing,
shelter and parental guidance . . ." and are injured due to "involuntary
neglect, poverty, and necessitous circumstances ... " the unintentional
neglect by a parent will not be included in this article. California Legisla-
tive Approach to Problems of Willful Child Abuse, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1805
(1966) [hereinafter cited as California Approach].
Dependent or neglected children who have suffered the intentional neg-
lect of legal duties (e.g., education, medical treatment, and moral develop-
ment) by a parent are excluded. E.g., In re Hargy, 23 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 129
(Dom. Rel. Ct. Hamilton County 1920) (parent's refusal to have child in-
noculated prevented child from attending public school); State v. Perri-
cone, 37 N.J. 463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962) (parent's religious objections to
medical transfusions placed blue baby's life in imminent danger); In re
Douglas, 11 Ohio Op. 2d 340, 164 N.E.2d 475 (Juv. Ct. Huron County 1959)
(relating to sickly and malnourished children of promiscuous parents).
2. Identification of the abused child is tempered by awareness of the
fact that children may suffer physical mars, bruises, and scratches due nei-
ther to parental neglect nor intent, and at any one time may coincidentally
show a variety of types of physical marks (e.g., a black eye, cut lip,
bruised ear, scratches, and diaper rash burns), even though their parents
may be loving, concerned, and reasonably careful.
3. Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller, & Silver, The Battered-
Child Syndrome, 181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Kempe].
4. Although the social and emotional growth of children may be affected
by the rearing techniques of their parents, arguments in favor of one over
another type of parental rearing technique are not discussed in that the
state of psychological knowledge concerning their effects is such that pre-
diction is on a probabilistic standard and not absolutely determinable. Cf.
R. SEARS, E. MAccOBY & H. LwvnI, PATTERNS OF CHILD REARING (1957) for a
study of the effects of different techniques on the personality develop-
ment of children.
5. Although a child's mental and emotional development may suffer
when the child is an emotional scapegoat of the family (i.e., belittled, de-
ferent cases nationwide described types of injuries which were in-
volved.
The majority of battered children were marred by various sizes
and forms of bruises and contusions, such as welts, swollen limbs,
split lips, black eyes, and lost teeth. One child lost an eye.
Many had broken bones, both simple and compound fractures;
arms and legs were broken, and ribs were fractured. Having more
than one fracture was common, and thirty broken bones were
found in the small body of one five-month-old child.
The internal and head injuries were particularly grim and ac-
counted for a great many of the fatalities. In this group, damage
to internal organs, such as ruptured livers, spleens, and lungs
were found. Concussions or skull fractures with brain hemorrhage
and brain damage were frequently diagnosed.
The types of abuse were numerous and presented awesome and
shocking evidence of the ingenuity and inventiveness of man. Most
injuries resulted from beatings with various kinds of implements
and instruments. The hairbrush was used often but did not have
as deadly an impact as other implements, such as bare fists, straps,
electric cords, sticks, and bottles.8
rided, scorned, but not physically injured), this type of situation has not
been included in state reporting laws of child abuse. CAL. PEN. CoDS
§ 11161.5 (West Cum. Supp. 1968). However, CAL. PEN. CODE § 273a (West
Cum. Supp. 1968) makes the infliction of unjustifiable mental suffering on
a child a crime. Cf., California Approach, supra note 1, at 1812, 1815, for
a discussion of the inclusion of mental suffering in the ambit of reporting
statutes in California.
Part of the problem is that the psychological effects of such abuse are
neither as understandable nor as overtly observable as physical ones and
must be measured by a standardized examining device in order to be de-
tected. Detection may also be made by the examination of a trained ob-
server such as a psychiatrist or psychologist rather than by the eye of a
layman or reasonably prudent man; this is true even in light of the every-
day manner of describing problematic individuals in terms of their family
backgrounds, emotional climates, and environments. From a legal frame of
reference, valid objections would be made to such a basis for a charge of
abuse on the grounds of policy considerations, that restrictions on types of
parental behavior would extend beyond the scope of possible control of
the court for enforcement to say nothing of the need to consider the legis-
lative intent of the existing laws.
6. CAL. WEIFZ. & INsT'x CODE § 18250 (West 1966) states that "[tjhe
board of supervisors of any county may establish such programs as are
deemed necessary to provide protective services for children, so as to ensure
that the rights or physical, mental, or moral welfare of children are not
violated or threatened by their present circumstances or environment."
7. V. DEFRANcIs, CHmLD ABusE--PREviEw OF A NATIONWIDE SURvEY (1963)
[hereinafter cited as DEFRANCIS].
8. Other implements which were used equally effectively included tele-
vision aerials, ropes, rubber hoses, fan belts, wooden spoons, pool cues,
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The children's extremities, hands, arms, and feet, had often
been burned in open flames such as from gas burners or cigarettes,
electric irons, or hot pokers. Others suffered scaldings from hot
liquids being thrown over them or from being dipped into hot li-
quids. Strangulations and suffocations of some children were
caused by pillows held over their mouths or plastic bags thrown
over their heads. Many were drowned in bathtubs, one child was
buried alive, and another had pepper forced down his throat.
Children had also been stabbed, bitten, shot, subjected to electric
shock, thrown violently to the floor or against a wall, and stamped
on.
9
Dr. John Caffey became aware of the problem in 1946 when he
reported the coincidence of long bone fractures and subdural hem-
atomas 10 and noted that when a reasonable history or explanation
of the trauma. was absent, many of the cases raised the question
of intentional ill treatment.' 2 In 1962 Dr. Charles Kempe and
others published a study based on reports of 71 hospitals and 77
district attorneys which established guidelines for the diagnosis
of the battered child syndrome.'3
The syndrome should be considered in any child exhibiting evidence
of possible trauma or neglect (fracture of any bone, subdural hema-
toma, multiple sofe tissue injuries, poor skin hygiene, or malnutri-
tion) or where there is a marked discrepancy between the clinical
findings and the historical data as supplied by the parents. In
cases where a history of specific injury is not available, or in any
child who dies suddenly, roentgenograms' 4 of the entire skeleton
should be obtained in order to ascertain the presence of character-
istic multiple bony lesions in various stages of healing.15
broom handles, baseball bats, chair legs, a sculling oar, street and heavy
work shoes.
9. DEFRAucis, supra note 7, at 5-7.
10. A subdural hematoma is a tumor or swelling caused by a collec-
tion of blood situated beneath the outermost of the three coverings of the
brain and spinal cord. B.S. MALoY, THE SnVMPLuIU MEDICAL DIcTIONARY FOR
LAWYERs 279, 521 (2d ed. 1951) [hereinafter cited as MfEDICAL DIcTONARY].
11. A trauma is medically defined as a wound or injury. DoRLA Is IL-
LUSTRATED IMEDIcAL DIcTIONARY 1605 (24th ed. 1965).
12. Caffey, Multiple Fractures in the Long Bones of Infants Suffering
from Chronic Subdural Hematoma, 56 Am. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 163 (1946).
13. Kempe, supra note 3, at 17.
14. A roentgenogram is a roentgen-ray, or x-ray, photograph. MEtDIcAL
DIcToNARY, supra note 10, at 483, 491.
15. Kempe, supra note 3, at 17.
The doctor's diagnosis of child abuse involves analyzing several
observations. Probably the most obvious one to the physician is
that the parents cannot give a suitable or plausible explanation
for the cause of the child's injuries.16 Although the cause is prob-
ably difficult to determine on the basis of the clinical symptoms
alone, the occurrence of an aggregate of physical symptoms and
problems in one child would be expected to arouse the physician's
interest concerning possible abuse.17 The use of x-rays to analyze
the condition of the child's limbs may also aid the physician's diag-
nosis, as the abused child has often been twisted and jerked in such
a manner as to break his bones.'
8
Problem of Identifying the Battered Child-
By Whom and Why Not?
Given the recognition by the medical field of the problem, one
might assume that identifying the severely battered child so as to
alleviate his problems would be a relatively simple task, which
would be assumed willingly by physicians. University of Minne-
sota Professor of Law Alan H. McCoid has explained the physician's
role in the following manner.
The physician more than any other individual is able to determine
whether the child's injuries are consistent with the parent's recital
of a history of nontraumatic events or of minor 'accidental' injury.
It is the psysician who is best able to discover the evidence of
multiple injuries in various stages of healing which have come to
be recognized as 'signs' of the battered child syndrome, or the
'maltreatment syndrome' and to emphasize the role of the medical
practitioner in its detection may explain why legislators have
looked to the medical profession as the class most likely to make
disclosures of child abuse.19
Physicians actually have been very reluctant to diagnose a phy-
sically abused child, partly because the syndrome is generally, ra-
ther than specifically, defined in terms of symptoms,2 0 and partly
16. V. FONTANA, THE MALTRZATED CLD: TnE MALTREATmENT SYNDROME
16 (1964) [hereinafter cited as FONTANA]; Kempe, supra note 3, at 18.
17. Gwinn, Lewin, & Peterson, Roentgenographic Manifestations of Un-
suspected Trauma in Infancy, 176 J.A.M.A. 926, 927, 929 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Gwinn].
18. Id. at 927.
19. McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Fam-
ily: Part One, 50 Mne. L. Ruv. 1, 28 (1965) [hereinafter cited as McCoid].
20. Le., the syndrome is not defined in terms of which bones are
broken, the number of bones broken, the sizes and number of bruises, or
other kinds of abuse. Rather, it is defined in terms of the total condition
of the child (e.g., whether there are a number of injuries in varying states
of healing, including any number of types of symptoms from scratches to
subdural hematomas) plus the lack of a suitable explanation for the injuries
by the parent.
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because the physician has been professionally trained to be rela-
tively certain before he labels the cause of the symptoms. He is
seldom willing to extend his professional expertise to an unfamiliar
area, that involving a judgment of whether or not the child fits the
battered child syndrome. While he may be confident, for example,
that the child has an arm broken in five or six places and that this
diagnosis indicates the proper treatment (for example, bandaging,
operating), he is less willing to judge the cause of the broken arm.
Though the doctor may assume a traumatic origin of the injury, he
often does not define the source of the trauma and prefers to con-
centrate upon the physical condition of the child.21
Also, the physician's role is partly to diagnose and prescribe treat-
ment so as to heal the injury or disease. He cannot be certain that
his diagnosis (that is, that the child is battered) will benefit the
child. While one might conceptualize the syndrome as a disease
with etiological factors and alternative solutions or treatments
varying in effectiveness with the individual, the difficulty is that
the etiological factors are not biological or physiological but more
psychological in that another person with motives unfamiliar to the
physician has inflicted the injury (s). This is more a problem for a
psychologist or psychiatrist, lawyer and judge. The doctor may not
be willing to extend his frame of reference to these factors when
the immediate and imminent problem is the child's physical health;
this may not be a conscious process but rather a matter of profes-
sional training for a specific role which does not extend to making
professional judgments outside his area of training, knowledge,
and experience.
Asssuming that the doctor considers the possibility of diagnosing
the child's problems as being due to battering, unlike his diagnosis
of other problems which are medical, he has no direct control over
the treatment of the cause, presumably the parent of the child. In
comparison to his use of drugs and medication for the treatment
of other medical problems, he often does not know what the treat-
ment is. If the physician believes that the ramifications of such a
diagnosis lie within the legal and judicial realm, he is not clear what
the effects on the parent and child will be and may be even less sure
that the effects will benefit his patient the child.
21. McCoid, supra note 19, at 4.
Also, some physicians have been reluctant to diagnose child abuse
cases due to their unwillingness to believe that parents or others
in loco parentis would have intended to hurt the child and their
apparent refusal to assume responsibility for interrogation or in-
vestigation.22 The usual orientation of physicians to identify and
sympathize with parents is contrary to a hostile, critical, question-
ing approach. If a physician considers the possibility of battering,
he often does not know how to resolve the conflict between such
opposing attitudes. 23  Others have taken the view that the phy-
sician's responsibility is to his patient the child, not the parent, and
feel that analysis of the cause would only be a logical extension of
the physician's obligation to his patient.
24
The medical practitioner is also bound by an ethical principle of
confidentiality to disclose no medical confidences or secrets in order
to enable him to make a correct diagnosis and to treat his patient
"safely and efficaciously. '25 A supporting argument is that any
loss of confidentiality will deter parents from bringing their chil-
dren to doctors for aid, while the opposing one is that a disclosure
by a medical doctor will provide the abused child patient with in-
creased protection. This is a serious matter, since the child may be
placed in equally great danger by failure to both obtain medical
care for immediate injuries and prevent potential future injury.
20
The problem is mostly one of overcoming the individual physician's
feelings against informing, as the legal recognition of a physician-
patient testimonial privilege or the professional ethics of the medi-
cal field do not preclude the physician from making a report to
the legal authorities of suspected child abuse, a report not con-
cerning his patient but a third party.
27
Another reason a physician may not report his suspicions is that
he may fear civil or criminal responsibility or liability for making
an erroneous report even though he is fairly assured of being able
to successfully defend against liability. 28 He may also hold an un-
22. Id. at 11, 29, 36 & n.85; Kempe, supra note 3, at 19-21; Comment,
The Abused Child: Problems and Proposals, 8 DUQUESNn L. Rav. 136, 145
(1969-70) [hereinafter cited as The Abused Child]; Bain, The Physically
Abused Child, 31 PED.A mcs 895, 896 (1963).
23. See Silver, Child Abuse Syndrome: A Review, 96 MEDICAL TIMs
803, 813 (1968) for a discussion of typical mistakes made by examining
physicians of injured children [hereinafter cited as Silver].
24. McCoid, supra note 19, at 32-35.
25. C. DEWITT, PRI-ILEGED COMMUNICATIONS B-WEEN Pnysxcr4N AN)
PATIENT at 27 passim (1958).
26. McCoid, supra note 19, at 36-37.
27. Id. at 41.
28. Id. at 37, 39-41.
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defined fear of legal involvement with investigating police or wel-
fare authorities, 29 which hardly seems reasonable in light of the
probable ill-effects for the child of non-disclosure but may not
seem completely unreasonable when considered in terms of the
probable loss of the physician's valuable time, which he could
otherwise spend ministering directly to the medical needs of other
patients.
While medical practitioners may be relatively well equipped to
discover, identify, and diagnose child abuse cases, at least in terms
of the symptoms of physical maltreatment and resultant injury,
30
other members of the citizenry have opportunities to learn of the
abused child and have not hesitated to report their suspicions.
These include law enforcement officers, social workers, school
teachers, counselors and lawyers engaged in dealing with family
problems; they have tended to fulfill their moral and/or profes-
sional obligations to disclose information or start the remediation
processes of government agencies to assist the child whenever they
have learned of an abused child situation.31
Although reporting laws will be discussed in a separate section,
it is appropriate to mention at this point that the American Medi-
cal Association feels that, regardless of the optimal position the
physician may hold for identification of child abuse situations, the
legal duty to report such situations should not fall exclusively on
the physician but rather also equally on other members of the com-
munity.
This is a social problem in which the physician plays but a part.
Visiting nurses, social workers, school teachers and authorities,
lawyers, marriage and guidance counselors, and others frequently
learn of cases before medical care is demanded or received. To
wait until the child requires medical attention is too late. To
compel reporting by the physician alone may single him out un-
wisely. Knowing of this requirement, the parent or guardian may,
for his own protection, put off seeking medical care.32
29. Id. at 37.
30. Cal. Report of the Assembly Interim Comm. on Criminal Procedure,
Reporting of Child Abuse 68, 71 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Cal. Report on
Child Abuse]; V. DEFRANcis, GUIDELINES FOR LEGISLATIoN TO PROTECT THE
BATTERED CHIL 6 (1962).
31. Paulsen, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation,
67 CoLum. L. REv. 1, 4 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Reporting Laws]; Mc-
Coid, supra note 19, at 28-31.
32. 188 J.A.M.A. 386 (1964).
A report was made in 1960 by Mr. Edgar J. Merrill of the Law-
rence-Lowell District of the Massachusetts Society for the Preven-
tion of Cruelty to Children. The report was based on a study of
over 100 cases involving 200 children referred to the Massachu-
setts Society. Of the reporting sources, relatives and law enforce-
ment authorities each had made approximately 23-24 percent of
the referrals, and while physicians had seen about 30 percent of the
cases, they had referred only 9 percent of them. 5 It thus might ap-
pear that medical practitioners were reluctant to report and diag-
nose the battered child syndrome, while other members of the citi-
zenry were more willing to report their suspicions. Interpretation
of this statistic must be made carefully, however, as the physicians
who had seen the 30 percent may have made a professional judg-
ment that an official report would not aid the 21 percent of children
whom they did not report.3 4 At the time of the report the Massa-
chusetts legislature had not enacted a reporting statute for physi-
cians and thus what reports they made were essentially voluntary,
lacked legal sanction and may have provoked fears of possible lia-
bility.
Frequency of Occurrence of the Battered Child Syndrome
The incidence of the battered child problem is somewhat indic-
ative of the significance of the problem today. The statistics
which are available must be interpreted in light of the above dis-
cussion in that a reluctance to recognize and report such cases may
tend to make the available statistics lower than what they would
be if there were better standards for or fewer obstacles to over-
come in reporting suspected cases.35  Thus one may infer that the
available statistics on child abuse have not been complete.3 6 The
33. Bryant, Billingsley, Kerry, Leefman, Merrill, Senecal & Walsh, Physi-
cal Abuse of Children-An Agency Study, 42 Cmu WELFARE 125, 129
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Bryant].
34. In some states the power of discretion to report has been statutor-
ily granted to physicians. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West 1963), did
not require the physician to report "if in his opinion it would not be con-
sistent with the health, care or treatment of the minor," but as amended,
(West Cune. Supp. 1968), the physician is no longer exempted on this
basis; MAss. Am. LAws ch. 119, § 39A (1969) (originally enacted June
15, 1964, effective 90 days thereafter) provides that physicians or medical
officers who have reasonable cause to believe that a child whom they have
examined or treated is "suffering from serious physical injury or abuse in-
flicted by a parent or other person responsible for the care of such child
shall report such injury or abuse .... " The Massachusetts law thus did
not have such an exemption clause.
35. Cal. Report on Child Abuse, supra note 30, at 70.
36. If complete statistics were available, the maltreatment of children
could be a more frequent cause of death than leukemia, cystic fibrosis
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numbers have not been low,87 however.
Perhaps the more telling fact about the problem than the nu-
merical figures of frequency is the severity38 with which it occurs.
A battered child is not reported unless his life is endangered. Chil-
dren who may be properly classified in the syndrome and are re-
turned to their parents following medical or hospital treatment are
seldom returned to a less abusing environment, often required la-
ter medical care and suffer repeated abuse.39 It has been noted
also that children who are brought into court for two hearings sel-
dom survive to a third.
40
What Are the Age and Familial Characteristics Associated
with the Battered Child Syndrome?
A number of characteristics of the battered child have been
observed by those who have studied the syndrome. Usually only
and muscular dystrophy, and it may rank with automobile accidents and
encephalitis as causes of disturbance of the central nervous system. Fox-
TANA, supra note 16, at 6. Over 5000 dependency and neglect cases came to
the attention of the children's courts in New York City in 1962, but the
number of abuse cases were not distinguishable. Id. at 7.
37. Cookes County Hospital, servicing Chicago and its environs, had an
admission rate of physically abused children of approximately ten a day,
for a total admission of over 3600 in 1964. Id. at 7.
See Reporting Laws, supra note 31, at 1 n.1, for a comprehensive list of
references concerning the extent and frequency of child abuse in the United
States.
38. A small sampling of cases revealed that in one year 71 hospitals had
reported 302 cases (including 33 deaths, 85 cases of permanent brain in-
jury), and 77 district attorneys had reported 447 cases of child abuse (in-
volving 45 deaths, 29 cases of permanent brain injury). Kempe, supra note
3, at 17.
Helen Boardman, Director, Social Services, Children's Hospital, Los An-
geles, Cal., reported on a limited study of twelve suspected cases of child
abuse involving children under 3% years of age, of whom six were under
twelve months of age. One child had a history of repeated injuries and had
third degree burns covering the entire body for which the mother had been
charged with pouring boiling water on the child. After their injuries had
healed, all had been returned to parental custody. Later, it was found that
three were dead, two had died of injuries sustained after the parents were
placed on probation, while one had been removed from the parental home.
Boardman, A Project to Rescue Children from Inflicted Injuries, 7 SocIAL
WORK 43, 48-49 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Boardman].
39. See California Approach, supra note 1, at 1806 n.7, concerning the
repetitive nature of child abuse episodes.
40. Carpenter, Parent-Child Dilemma in the Courts, 30 OHIo ST. L.J.
292, 294 (1969).
one child in a family suffers abuse.41 Battered children tend to
be young4 2 and to suffer their battering at the hands of their par-
ents.43 One study indicated that the majority are less than one
year old,44 and another found that only ten percent of the abused
children surveyed were ten years old and the majority were under
age four. Of the children who died, over 80 percent were under age
four while a majority were under age two.
48
Race, cultural background and religion have not been found to
be correlated with child abuse.46 Although it has been found to
occur more predominantly with low income families, 47 the problem
has not been found to be restricted to any particular socio-economic
level.48  A study in Illinois found that 19 abused children had
parents with an annual income of over $7000, 121 (42.3 percent)
had parents with an income range of $4000-7000 a year, and 146
(51.1 percent) had families with less than $4000 a year.40 The
greater preponderance of low income families may, however, be
due to a possible difference in physician-patient relationships such
that the physician of the higher income family may be less inclined
to formally report suspected child abuse in order to maintain his
clientele, and for other reasons aforementioned, while the doctor
of the lower income family may not feel the same fear of loss
of clientele or intra-social level reprobation for his lack of confi-
dentiality.
Although one study50 found that abused children were char-
acterized by similar behavioral patterns which tend to provoke bat-
tering from their parents, most research studies have tended to con-
centrate on observing and classifying the psychological charac-
teristics of their abusers. The underlying causes of the abuser's
characteristics are not clear, although some abusive parents were
abused children. 5' Four types of individuals who batter their chil-
41. California Approach, supra note 1, at 1806.
42. The Abused Child, supra note 22, at 138.
43. Bryant, supra note 33, at 127 (in 86 percent of cases the abusing
adults were parents of the child).
44. Gwinn, supra note 17, at 927.
45. DEFRAicis, supra note 7, at 8.
46. California Approach, supra note 1, at 1806.
47. The Abused Child, supra note 22, at 138-40.
48. DEFRANcis, supra note 7, at 5-7.
49. From the States Legislation and Litigation, 75 J. Am, DENTAL
Ass'N 1081-82 (1967).
50. See Silver, supra note 23, at 809, 812, 813, for evidence that the abused
child may behave so as to invite aggressiveness from others and be hurt.
51. Id. at 812, FONTAxA, supra note 16, at 18-19; Kempe, supra note 3, at
18; Bryant, supra note 33, at 127.
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dren have been identified.52 One type included physically dis-
abled fathers whose frustrations led them to maintain rigid disci-
pline with rapid, severe punishment. Another category was of pas-
sive, dependent, and immature parents. A third group was of indi-
viduals who were continually hostile and aggressive, whose attri-
butes stemmed from internal conflicts and led to physical expres-
sions of violence on the child. Another type was composed of par-
ents who were compulsive, rigid, and lacking in warmth toward
their children.
Beaters of children have been considered to be either unstable
and emotionally immature or so self-centered that they view the
child as a personal handicap,5 3 as well as being mentally ill.54 Se-
vere child injuries have also been attributed to parental alcoholism,
indifference, irresponsibility and immaturity which was manifested
in poorly controlled aggressive behavior.55 The study by Dr.
Charles Kempe and others in 1962 concluded that the parents were
immature, impulsive, egocentric, hypersensitive, and overly reac-
tive with poorly controlled aggression, and appeared to have a de-
fective ability to control aggressive impulses.56
Another study also indicated that the families of battered
children tended to be lacking in group and community integration
and to be in a state of marital discord, of which only one cause was
that of pre-marital conception in slightly less than fifty percent of
the cases.57 In another study the victim of abuse was found to be
usually the youngest child in the family, perhaps because the child
was an unwanted addition to the family.5 8
The conclusion may be drawn, therefore, that the abuser tends to
suffer from emotional pressures which are not directly related to
the child himself, focuses his own general feelings of frustration
and anger on the one child,5 9 and expresses his emotions through
an immature and uncontrolled display of physical abuse of the
child.
52. Bryant, supra note 33, at 127-28.
53. Boardman, supra note 38, at 47.
54. DEFRANcis, supra note 7, at 5-7.
55. Cameron, Johnson, & Camps, The Battered Child Syndrome, 6
MEDICINE, SciENcE & L. 2, 17 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Cameron].
56. Kempe, supra note 3, at 18.
57. Bryant, supra note 33, at 127.
58. Cameron, supra note 55, at 14.
59. Boardman, supra note 38, at 45.
There have also been a few indications that, if the battered child
survives his physically maligning environment, he may become a
somewhat unsocialized member of the community. As already
noted, the battered child may become a battering parent. There
are also indications from studies with small samples that he may
become a juvenile delinquent" or criminal as an adult.0 1 From the
findings of a larger study of juvenile delinquency,0 2 the battered
child has been similarly hypothesized as having a predisposition for
delinquency. 63 The parents of delinquents tended to employ erratic
disciplinary techniques and to be more physically punishing and
over-strict than parents of non-delinquents. Whether or not these
findings may lead to the inference that the battered child tends to
become a juvenile delinquent is questionable, since the study was
not an experimental one employing control groups and focused on
the delinquent rather than the battered child. (That is, did the pa-
rental punishment cause the delinquency, did the delinquency pro-
voke the erratic and severe parental behavior, or does parental
punishment influence how the child behaves outside the home?)
Because the amount of research data is limited, the conclusion
must only be drawn that while child abuse may be an antecedent
factor in the history of the individual who later displays antisocial
conduct, it is not necessarily the causal factor in criminality.6 4
THE LAWS
Theories of Regulation
Before attempting to review the existing kinds of legislation and
their objectives concerning the battered child, it is necessary to
first consider the theories of regulation upon which the laws are
based. The principle that a parent may discipline his child by phy-
sical punishment is based on common law heritage. 5 In the United
60. A study of seven boys who had made murderous assaults and one
who had committed murder revealed that three had been regularly beaten
harshly and the others had probably suffered *similar beatings. Easson &
Steinhilber, Murderous Aggression by Children and Adolescents, 4 ARcH.
GEN. PsYcHIATRY 27, 29-32 (1961).
61. Six criminals convicted of first-degree murder in a study had been
badly abused by their parents as youths. Duncan, Frazier, Litin, Johnson
& Barron, Etiological Factors in First-Degree Murder, 168 J.A.M.A. 1755,
1758 (1958).
62. S. GLUEcK & F. GLUEcic, UNRAVELNG JuvENIE DErmQUENcy 131-33
(1951).
63. Shepherd, The Abused Child and the Law, 22 WAsH. & LEE L. REV.
182, 188-89 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Shepherd].
64. But see Shepherd, supra note 63, at 189 & n.46, for support of the
conclusion that a causal relationship exists between child abuse and subse-
quent conduct by the battered child.
65. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 3.08, Comment at 72 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
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States the courts have taken two different approaches with respect
to the limits of parental discipline. The minority and older, sub-
jective approach provides that the parent, or one in loco parentis,
is the judge as to the degree of punishment, and punishment which
does not result in disfigurement or permanent injury, or is not in-
flicted maliciously, is reasonable.6 6 A parent or parental substitute
is not liable for the use of reasonable force which might other-
wise be considered an assault and battery if the parental relation-
ship did not existY' This older approach takes the position that un-
less permanent injury resulted from the defendant's act or unless
the act was done maliciously, the defendant is within the protection
of the in loco parentis rule.68 If the punishment is for an improper
purpose or improper in itself, the rule will not apply. 9
The rationale of this position emphasizes the significance of the
infliction of permanent injury, as averse to pain, and is stated in an
1837 North Carolina opinion in State v. Pendergrass.70
The welfare of the child is the main purpose for which pain is
permitted to be inflicted. Any punishment, therefore, which may
seriously endanger life, limbs or health, or shall disfigure the child,
or cause any other permanent injury, may be pronounced in itself
immoderate, as not only being unnecessary for, but inconsistent
66. Nicholas v. State, 32 Ala. App. 574, 575, 28 So. 2d 422, 425 (1946)
(Appellate court upheld conviction of assault and battery on defendant's
stepson for defendant's inflicting "immoderate punishment" which was
done with legal malice and wicked motive, and inflicted permanent in-
jury); State v. Jones, 95 N.C. 588, 592, 59 Am. Rep. 282, 286 (1886) (Citing
State v. Pendergrass, infra note 70, the North Carolina Supreme Court re-
versed the jury's finding of assault and battery by the father on his 16
year-old daughter, and stated that the test "of criminal responsibility is
the infliction of permanent injury by means of the administered punish-
ment, or that it proceeded from malice, and was not in the exercise of a
corrective authority.") The Jones case is an old case but one of the land-
mark cases, and more recent cases cite to it.
67. People v. Jones, 187 Cal. App. 2d 335, 9 Cal. Rptr. 508 (1960)
(murder of child).
68. State v. Jones, supra note 66, at 592, 59 Am. Rep. at 286; Dean v.
State, 89 Ala. 46, 8 So. 38 (1890) (conviction of man in loco parentis to six-
year old child overturned on basis that the rule for criminal liability for im-
moderate chastisement is that there must be legal malice or wicked motive
or the infliction of permanent injury, and not a showing of unreasonable -or
immoderate severity.) This old case is one of the landmark cases for this
premise and more recent cases cite to it.
69. People v. Jones, supra note 67 (conviction of murder by person in
loco parentis of three-year-old boy upheld).
70. 19 N.C. 348 (1837). This old case is a landmark case for this ration-
ale and more recent cases cite to it.
with, the purpose for which correction is authorized. But any
correction, however severe, which produces temporary pain only,
and no permanent ill, cannot be so pronounced, since it may have
been necessary for the reformation of the child, and does not in-
juriously affect its future welfare.7 1
Although Pendergrass involved an assault and battery charge
against a teacher, it was decided on the ground that the teacher's
power to correct pupils was analogous to the parent's privilege to
discipline children. The court said ascertaining whether the teach-
er's intent was to discipline is an important factor in determining
whether there has been an abuse of discretion.
7 2
When the correction administered, [sic] is not in itself immoderate,
and therefore beyond the authority of the teacher, its legality or
illegality must depend entirely ... on the quo animo with which
it was administered. Within the sphere of his authority, the master
is the judge when correction is required, and of the degree of cor-
rection necessary; and like all others intrusted with a discretion
he cannot be made penally responsible for error of judgment, but
only for wickedness of purpose.. . . His judgment must be
presumed correct, because he is the judge, and also because of the
difficulty of proving the offence, or accumulation of offences, that
called for correction; of showing the peculiar temperament, disposi-
tion, and habits of the individual corrected; and of exhibiting the
various milder means, that may have been ineffectually used, be-
fore correction was resorted to.
73
The rule in Pendergrass imposed strict liability on teachers or
parents when permanent injury resulted from use of force which
the actor in good faith believed would inflict only a moderate
amount of pain.
The majority or objective view74 of the limits of parental disci-
pline is that a parent has
... a right to punish a child within the bounds of moderation
and reason, so long as he does it for the welfare of the child; but
that if he exceeds due moderation, he becomes criminally liable.7 5
71. Id. at 349-50.
72. Id. at 349
73. Id. at 350.
74. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 27, at 140 (3d ed. 1964), [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER]. (citing criminal cases; CAL. PEN. CODE § 273a (West
Cum. Supp. 1968).
75. Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 851, 862, 863, 44 S.E.2d 419,
423 (1947) (the court stated that a jury determines what is reasonable or
beyond the bounds of moderation); Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366, 368, 206
N.W. 173, 175 (1925) (eleven-year-old boy unreasonably punished in view
of his conduct, the nature of the misconduct, the nature of the instrument
used for punishment, and the marks or wounds left on his body); People v.
Curtiss, 116 Cal. App. 771, 782, 300 P. 801, 805 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1931)
(a teacher may not inflict punishment at all under unwarrantable circum-
stances or excessive punishment under warrantable circumstances, the
test of reasonableness applying both to punishment of the child and the
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This approach holds the defendant to an "external standard of
what is reasonable under the circumstances,"'' 6 and imposes liabil-
ity for willfully, wrongfully, unlawfully, knowingly, recklessly, or
negligently using excessive force on a child.77 The jury decides
what is reasonable under the circumstances.
78
An Ohio court79 has singularly adopted a middle ground between
the subjective and objective approaches by differentiating the case
in terms of whether a teacher and student or a parent and child are
involved. The basis for the distinction by the court is that the
teacher-pupil relationship is relatively objective in that the teacher
performs in a "quasi-judicial capacity which requires a maximum of
discretion"80 and should be given the benefit of a subjective or good
faith standard. The parent-child relationship is inherently subjec-
tive and often involves hatreds and strong emotions. It therefore
follows that an objective or reasonable man standard should be ap-
plied.8'
question of the degree of punishment). These old cases are landmark
cases for this view and more recent cases cite to them.
76. PROSSER, supra note 74, § 27, at 140. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08,
Comment at 72 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958) (relating to the use of force by
persons with responsibility for the care, discipline, or safety of others, the
force not being designed to cause death, serious bodily harm, disfigurement,
extreme pain or mental distress or gross degradation).
77. State v. Hunt, 2 Ariz. App. 6, 406 P.2d 208 (1965) (the use of im-
moderate or excessive physical violence for correction is aggravated as-
sault); Carpenter v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 851, 44 S.E.2d 419 (1947)
(parent may punish but cannot exercise malevolence or the exhibition of
uncontrolled passion); Steber v. Norris, supra note 75, at 368, 206 N.W.
at 175.
78. People v. Curtiss, 116 Cal. App. 771, 782, 300 P. 801, 805 (App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1931) (magistrate sitting without a jury); State v. Straight, 136
Mont. 255, 269, 347 P.2d 482, 490 (1959) (Montana Supreme Court affirmed
that it is up to the jury to determine whether the parent, guardian, master
or teacher used force or violence which is reasonable in matter and moder-
ate in degree); 1 F. WHARTON, CRnvIINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 259 (1957).
79. Ohio has adopted the rule established in State v. Pendergrass, supra
note 70, at 367, for teacher-pupil but not parent-child cases.
80. State v. Lutz, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 402, 407, 113 N.E.2d 757, 760 (C.P.
1953) (teacher-pupil case differentiated from parent-child case on the basis
that the school teacher rarely punishes one child for the ill-will or malice
caused by the misdeeds of another, and "[t]he quasi-judicial capacity of
the school teacher punisher is therefore more impersonal and more im-
partial than that of a parent or step-parent punisher.") But see State v.
Straight, supra note 78, at 263, 347 P.2d at 490 (expressly disapproving of
the granting of a quasi-judicial capacity and unlimited discretion regard-
ing punishment of the child by one standing in loco parentis).
81. State v. Lutz, supra note 80, at 407, 113 N.E.2d at 760.
The principle, that the interests of the state as parens patriae
are superior to the rights of the parents or those in loco parentis,
2
has not been accepted in the United States democratic system be-
cause it connotes totalitarianism, and has consequently been bal-
anced in the courts by the constitutional rights of the parents. 83
In modern American society the extension of the interests of the
State have not been used as a device for aggrandizement of the
State but rather as a shield for the protection of the child.
Criminal Law
Criminal sanctions against child abuse are probably unnecessary
as the state penal codes which cover homicide and general assault
and battery cases apply to a parent's or caretaker's bringing about
the death of a child or inflicting physical harm upon a child. Nev-
ertheless, over thirty-five states have statutes covering cruelty to
children. s4 The range of offenses include abandonment, torture,
82. In re Hudson, 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942) (the right of the
state to exercise guardianship over a child is based on the common law
heritage and does not depend on a statute asserting that power). The rule
of Hudson followed in many subsequent cases was the rule of law well
before Hudson. Prior cases such as Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 43,
48, 62 A. 198 (1905) stand for the same premise. All such authority is
said to stem from the English case of Eyre v. Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wms. 1034, 24
Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1722) from which the parens patriae principle is de-
rived.
83. In re Tuttendario, 21 Pa. Dist. 561, 563 (1911) (case involving a boy
of seven suffering from rickets and in danger of being crippled for life but
denied the necessary operation by his parents; the court ruled that the de-
fective judgment [i.e., based on fear of the unknown effects of the opera-
tion] of the parents did not provide a good reason for depriving them of
their guardianship). This old case is one of the landmark cases for this
premise and more recent cases cite to it.
84. Aim. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-842 (Supp. 1969-70); Aam STAT. ANN.
§ 41-1105 (Supp. 1969); CAL. PEN. CODE § 273a (West 1970); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40-13-1 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. ch. 939, § 53-20
(1968); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 11, § 431 (Supp. 1968); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
828.04 (Supp. 1968); GA. CODE ANN., CP=MINAL CODs, tit. 26-2801 (1969);
HAwAIn REV. LAWS § 577-12 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1501 (1947);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2354, 2368 (Supp. 1968); IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-815
(Supp. 1970); KAN. LAWS of 1965, ch. 277, § 5; KY. REV. STAT. ANiN. §
208.020(4) (Supp. 1969); LA. Rsv. STAT. § 14:93 (1968); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. ch. 19, § 218 (Supp. 1970-71); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A (a)
(1967); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39B (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.-
107(2) (Supp. 1969-70); MONT. RPv. CODES AiN. § 94.306 (1969); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 38-115 to -117 (1968); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-316.1 (1969); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 571:1 (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-3 (Supp. 1969-70);
N.Y. PEN. LAW § 483 (McKinney 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-19 (Supp.
1969); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2903.08 (Supp. 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 843 (Supp. 1969-70); ORa. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.650 (1969); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4728 (Supp. 1970); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-9-5
(1970); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-301, 20-302 (1960); UTAH LAWS of 1965, ch.
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deprivation of the necessities of life, such as clothing, food, or medi-
cine, infliction of unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering,
impairment of morals, or injury in any other manner. The penal-
ties include imprisonment and/or the imposition of a fine. While
some states cover the acts by a parent, or one in loco parentis,8 5 the
trend in most states is to allow any person to be charged with the
crime of cruelty to children.
8 6
Inaction as well as action is frequently an offense. In a 1965 Cal-
ifornia case, People v. Beaugez,8 7 the parents of a five month old in-
fant were indicted under a statute which made it a crime to will-
fully cause or permit a child to be placed in a situation which en-
dangers its life or limb or is likely to injure its health.88 The case
involved problems of determining beyond a reasonable doubt that
the parents had inflicted the child's injuries, of establishing how
the injuries had been caused and of determining the actual extent
of the injuries.8 9 Yet the appellate court affirmed the conviction of
the parents and interpreted the statute in terms of the basic social
need which it addressed. The court felt that the type of parental
conduct from which children were being protected by the statute
could not be precisely defined, but that it included directly and in-
directly applied willful mistreatment. Indirect mistreatment was
given particular significance because it is often the only sort of
child abuse which can be proved; the usual occurrence of child
abuse in the privacy of the home prevents proving that one person
is directly responsible. Thus responsibility for the protection of
children is placed on those indirectly responsible-those who in-
tentionally allow dangerous situations to imperil children. In
Beaugez the young age, the parental custody and care, the injuries
and their inadequate explanation permitted the jury to draw the
165, § 18; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1304 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 40-112
(1953); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-21 to -26 (1965).
85. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 1A (a) (1967).
86. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-1105 (Supp. 1969); HAwAII REV. LAWS
8 577-12 (1968); ORE. REV. STAT. § 163.650 (1969). See Paulsen, The Legal
Framework for Child Protection, 66 COLum. L. REV. 679, 682-83 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Legal Framework] for a comprehensive discussion of
the differences in statutory structures relating to cruelty to children in
1966.
87. 232 Cal. App. 2d 650, 43 Cal. Rptr. 28 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
88. CAL. PEN. CODE § 273a (West Cum. Supp. 1968).
89. People v. Beaugez, supra note 87, at 653-54, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 30-31.
inference that each parent had been indirectly responsible for, and
guilty of, allowing a situation of reasonably forseeable danger to the
child to exist. A reasonably prudent parent would not have al-
lowed the child's safety to remain endangered.
Other types of criminal provisions designed to protect children
have been criticized.90 The fact that criminal statutes are applica-
ble to child abuse cases is not sufficient reason for prosecutors to
employ them in view of the problems which will be discussed.
Their vagueness and imprecise formulations may raise constitu-
tional questions. The Children's Bureau, in its Standards for Spe-
cialized Courts Dealing with Children,91 has favored omitting such
statutes and has suggested that there be no statutory crime of con-
tributing to the neglect of a minor. Because most such statutes
cover an infinitely wide spectrum of types of adult behavior and
are broadly phrased, (and therefore fail to provide a clear defini-
tion of neglect), they are more than sufficient in providing adequate
protection for children. The Children's Bureau's recommendation
is that a statute relating to children clearly should define the crime
and relate the misbehavior to an act which is a violation of law or
an omission to perform a duty required by law.
The criminal prosecution of parents for abuse may impeded the
continuance of the family's life. Placing the parent in prison may
needlessly separate child and parent and make the child's home
life more insecure and unstable. If fines are imposed, the family's
resources for other purposes and needs are reduced and may im-
pose greater hardships on the child than the parent. Condemnation
of a criminal conviction usually leads to social ostracism and an
impaired community reputation. Probation or a suspended sen-
tence for bringing changes within a family so as to permit a cer-
tain amount of stability to the home may be a more appropriate
alternative.
While leaving a child in the home may not always be desirable,
separating the child and parent by criminal processes is not neces-
sarily more desirable. Social services are not always made avail-
able following conviction. Prosecution is likely to end any chance
of improving the child's home life since parents usually resent the
proceeding and develop greater hostility toward the child. These
undesirable and socially alienating features of prosecution of the
parents may produce such intense feelings of hostility that the pos-
90. Legal Framework, supra note 86, at 688-91.
91. Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Standards
for Specialized Courts Dealing with Children 35 (1954) [hereinafter cited
as Children's Bureau].
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sibility of a social worker or probation officer conducting casework
and working with and effecting positive changes in the parent-
child relationship becomes non-existent. Further, fear of prose-
cution may only deter abusing parents from seeking medical as-
sistence for their battered child. Other impediments to meeting
the needs of the child are posed by the criminal rules of evidence92
and the typical postponements of court action93 which often leave
the child in the custody of his abuser. Thus criminal sanctions are
not the solution to child abuse problems.
Juvenile Court Acts
Juvenile courts have jurisdiction over neglected children in al-
most every state, and battered children fall within the category
of neglected children as defined by the relevant juvenile court
act.9 4 The National Probation and Parole Association offered the
model Standard Juvenile Court Act, stating that the juvenile court
has jurisdiction over any child "whose environment is injurious to
his welfare." 95
Many states have suitable provisions to cover emergency situa-
tions which may arise during weekends and in the evenings when
judges are not usually available so that immediate action can be
taken.
New York handles emergency cases by authorizing a peace officer
to remove a child from his home without an order and without
parental consent if the child's life or health is in imminent dan-
92. E.g., in People v. Forbs, 62 Cal. 2d 847, 402 P.2d 825, 44 Cal. Rptr. 753
(1965), the defendant mother had not been advised of her right to remain
silent or her right to counsel when a statement had been taken after the
investigation reached the accusatory state, and a conviction of voluntary
manslaughter was overturned.
93. See Legal Framework, supra note 86, at 692-3 n.97, for a lengthy ac-
count of some of the difficulties which one prosecutor faced. After numer-
ous adjournments, the date for trial arrived, the judges granted a motion to
transfer the case to the juvenile term of the Family Court, in which the
case was finally heard, the mother admitted the allegations, and only then
was the child taken from her.
94. E.g., CAL. WELP. & INsT' CODE § 600 (West 1970), places a person
within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if he is under twenty-one and
his home is an unfit place because of the cruelty, neglect, or depravity of
his parents, guardian, or other person in loco parentis.
95. STANDARD JUVENMLE COURT ACT § 8 (2) (b) (1959).
ger if he continues to live in the home, or there is not enough time
to apply for a court order.9 6
In California a police or probation officer has the power to re-
move a child from the custody of the parents if he has reasonable
cause to suspect the child is being abused.9 7 The California proce-
dure has been considered suitable in serious abuse cases where it is
imperative to remove the child immediately and indefinitely from
his parent's control.98 Yet it is a drastic procedure and the proba-
tion officer 'often has other alternatives, which are discretionary
and determined after his investigation of a case of suspected child
abuse.9 9 The alternatives include the supervision of parental treat-
ment of children 00 and the authorization of medical services. 10 1
Problems arise, however, due to the necessity for early discovery
of abuse cases and the inappropriateness of the probation depart-
ment as the primary agency for handling these cases. Since will-
ful abuse often results in serious injury or death and tends to be
repetitive, early discovery and intervention by public authority are
important to insuring the child's safety. Yet the persons who re-
96. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 324 (McKinney 1963).
97. CAL. WELrF. & INST'N CODE §§ 584, 625 (West Supp. 1970). Section
584 gives to every probation officer the same powers and authority as a
police officer; section 625 provides that a police officer may, without a war-
rant, take into temporary custody a minor whose home is an unfit place for
him to live by reason of the neglect, cruelty, or depravity of either of his
parents, or other person in loco parentis.
98. In re Florance, 47 C.2d 25, 300 P.2d 825 (1956) (the primary consid-
eration in proceedings to declare a minor a ward of the court is the minor's
welfare); In re Schultz, 99 Cal. App. 134, 277 P. 1049 (1929) (evidence was
sufficient to support finding that home in which the child was living was
an unfit place for the child).
99. CAL. WELT. & INST'x CODE § 652 (West 1966) imbues the probation
officer with the power of discretion of investigating suspected cases of
child abuse; this discretionary power may also be exercised by not investi-
gating. In re Petersen, 56 Cal. App. 2d 791, 133 P.2d 831 (4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1943) (probation officer shall make such investigation of the child
as is deemed necessary but the investigation is not mandatory and does not
require the probation officer to make an investigation in every case before
the petition is filed).
100. CAL. WELF. & INST'N CODE § 654 (West 1966) allows the probation
officer to supervise the minor for six months in lieu of filing a petition if the
parents consent. If consent is withheld the petition may be filed to declare
the child a dependent of the court.
Probation officers have also supervised a few families in which children
are living who have been neglected or mistreated. National Study Service,
Planning for the Protection and Care of Neglected Children in California
140 (Aug. 1965) [hereinafter cited as Neglected Children].
101. CAL. WELF. & INST'N CODE § 739 (West Supp. 1970). Medical
services may be authorized for a child in an emergency with the parents'
consent or when the parents cannot be reached, and over their objection if
so ordered by the court.
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port child abuse may be intimidated by the legal nature and de-
linquency orientation of the juvenile court to whom they report.
Also, probation departments are overloaded with delinquency cases,
and the abused children who fall under their jurisdiction may de-
velop unfortunate reputations due to the delinquency orienta-
tion.
0 2
If a full hearing is held to determine if the minor should be de-
dared a dependent child of the court and if so, what is to be done
with him, difficulties arise due to the necessity of having sufficient
and reliable evidence to present before the court. Although most
juvenile courts may establish child abuse by a preponderance
of the evidence rather than by proof beyond a reasonable doubt,103
the courts must have objective items of proof. What must be
proved for the juvenile court to intervene varies between the
states. 04 For example, in some states the basis is a parent's per-
sonal act of cruelty so that evidence from which inferences may
be drawn about the conduct of parents or others must be produced,
and this evidence is difficult to obtain. A finding of parental
fault may be based, however, on circumstantial evidence. 0 5 The
court will, in most cases, try to assume its responsibility of protec-
tion of the child even though the evidence fails to clarify whether
one or both parents have abused the child. 08
The issue to resolve in finding neglect is the determination of
102. Neglected Children, supra note 100, at 140-41.
103. People v. Beaugez, 232 Cal. App. 2d 650, 43 Cal. Rptr. 28 (3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
104. See Legal Framework, supra note 86, at 698-99, for an in-depth dis-
cussion of the problems of proof.
105. CAL. WELF. & INST'N CODE § 600 (West Supp. 1970) focuses upon
the conditions of the child's environment and direct parental involvement
in the causing of a child's injuries need not be proved. E.g., age of the child,
number and nature of the injuries, parental explanations which are not
persuasive, and continuous proximity of parent and child may be sufficient
evidence. People v. Beaugez, 232 Cal. App. 2d 650, 43 Cal. Rptr. 28 (3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1965). In other jurisdictions the cumulative effect of the tes-
timony has been sufficient to uphold a finding of intentionally inflicted
harm. In re Minors M. & S., Nos. 15,885 & 15,855A (Caddo Parish, La. Juv.
Ct. 1962).
106. In re S., 46 Misc. 2d 161, 259 N.Y.S.2d 164 (Family Ct. 1965) (find-
ing of neglect based upon evidence of unsatisfactorily explained injuries of
an infant in his own home); In re Minors M. & S., Nos. 15,885, 15,885A
(Caddo Parish, La. Juv. Ct. 1962) (the court being the source of protection
for the child).
what happened and whether these facts may be characterized as
neglect. The degree to which the court will interfere with parental
rights depends on the seriousness of the parent's misconduct, and
thus the court may determine that an order to remove the child
from the home may not be as appropriate as one to require supervi-
sion of the family by the probation staff.
107
The court also does not separate a finding of neglect from the
purpose for which the terms of its orders are to be used. For ex-
ample, the consequences of the court's order of disposition are im-
portant to a finding of neglect. In one case the order of disposition
of the court provided that inquiry be made into any mental, emo-
tional, or physical inadequacies of the parents, and if appropriate,
guidance or counseling be initiated for the parents.1 08 Thus the
purpose of the court is to help both the child and his parents.
The juvenile court in California may order a child, who has been
declared a dependent of the court, to be placed under the super-
vision of the probation officer, or committed to the custody of any
reputable person, an association or public agency equipped to care
for such children, or the probation officer for finding a suit-
able home or institution. 09 The family court in New York has
been given a great deal of flexibility and a number of alternatives
in the disposition of the abused child. The judge may suspend
judgment for a period during which specific terms and conditions
are imposed upon the parents or custodians." 0 He may allow the
child to remain in the custody of his parents when the parents will
be supervised by a probation service.-" He may enter an order of
protection which establishes additional rules of behavior for the
parent or custodian.1 2  He may also remove the child from his
home and place the child in the custody of a relative, or a public
107. See In re Diaz, 212 La. 700, 703, 33 So. 2d 201, 202 (1947) (the Su-
preme Court of Louisiana reversed a finding of neglect which had been
based on the acts of a mother who had spanked her 3 month old infant in
a physician's office. The court held that "[t]his isolated instance in view
of the overwhelming testimony that the mother properly cared for the
child, does not afford sufficient grounds to take the infant from its mother
and place it in an asylum, and is not sufficient to constitute the lack of
proper guardianship.") This older case is cited by more recent cases for
its rationale.
108. In re S., supra note 106, at 162, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 165 (the court held
that the condition of the battered child spoke for itself, thus permitting an
inference of neglect to be drawn from proof of child's age [one month old]
and condition, and absent a satisfactory explanation, the court found neg-
lect on the part of the parents).
109. CAL. WELF. & INST'N CODE § 727 (West Supp. 1970).
110. N.Y. FAmvY CT. ACT § 353 (McKinney 1963).
111. Id. § 354(a).
112. Id. §§ 354(a), 356.
The Battered Child
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
or private agency.113
A drawback to an order of protective supervision of an abused
child is that the family may resent the intervention of an outsider.
Yet if the supervision is to be effective, the Children's Bureau has
stated that it should
not be allowed to degenerate into mere watchfulness. It should be
... a purposeful activity directed towards the improvement of the
child's situation through the use of established casework techniques
and the utilization of other community resources.114
The California Welfare and Institutions Code states that once the
child becomes a dependent child of the court, the child will remain a
dependent for not more than one year unless there is a hearing by
the court to so adjudge the child.11 New York limits the duration
of an order of supervision to one year unless there are exceptional
circumstances.116
The recourse of separating the child from his parents and home is
not a popular one to both judges and legislators. The juvenile
court judge has the difficult task of balancing the interests of the
parents against the probability of continuing danger to the child. 17
It is especially difficult in light of the fact that predicting the re-
currence of misbehavior is tenuous at best and the evidence often
has not clearly established that the parents were the actual perpe-
trators of the abuse."18 Juvenile court judges, therefore, are faced
with making difficult practical decisions in regards to child abuse
cases, for how they rule may depend on the relative feasibility of
the alternatives available for the child's care (that is, leaving the
child in the home as averse to removing him and finding a suitable
kind of institution for his care), as well as the facts of each case.
Reporting Statutes
Many states" 9 have child abuse reporting laws which either re-
113. Id. § 355(a).
114. Children's Bureau, supra note 91, at 73.
115. CAL. WELF. & INST'N CODE § 729 (West 1966).
116. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 354(b) (McKinney 1963).
117. N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 312, Committee Comments, at 65 (McKin-
ney 1963).
118. Legal Framework, supra note 86, at 702.
119. ALA. CODE tit. 27, §§ 21-25 (Supp. 1966); ALAS. STAT. tit. 11, §§
11.67.010 to .070 (Supp. 1969); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01 (Supp.
quire or permit physicians and others to report their suspicions
when appropriate. The purpose of these statutes includes imple-
menting the discovery of suspected child abuse cases by imparting a
certain degree of immunity from legal liability to the reporter for
making a report,1 20 providing protection to the child by making pro-
visions for the handling of a report by a suitable agency,1 2 1 and re-
moving any legal prohibition that may prevent the physician from
testifying about the case in court. 22 The following discussion will
consider the basic characteristics and significance of reporting laws
in trying to alleviate the problems which the abused child presents.
The legislative models suggested by different groups 128 have
1969-70); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-801 to -806 (Supp. 1969); CAL. PEN. CODs
§ 11161.5 (West Supp. 1970); COLO. Rsv. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-13-1 to -7 (1963);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. ch. 301, tit. 17, § 38a (1968); GA. CoD ANN. tit.
74-111 (Supp. 1969); IDAHO CODs ANN. § 16-1641 (Supp. 1969); ILL. ANN.
STAT., ch. 23, §§ 2041-47 (Supp. 1970); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 52-1419 to -1425
(Supp. 1970); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 235A.1 to .8 (1969); KAIN. STAT. ANN.
§ 38-716 to -721 (Supp. 1969); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.335 (Supp.
1969); LA. REv. STAT. Am. § 14:403 (Supp. 1968); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, §§ 3851-55 (Supp. 1970-71); AM. ANN. COD art. 27, § llA(b-d)
(Supp. 1969); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 39A (1969); Mum. STAT. ANN.
§ 626.554 (Supp. 1970); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.105 (Supp. 1970); MONT.
REv. CODES ANN. §§ 10-901 to -905 (1968); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 200.501-.507
(Supp. 1967); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 571:25 to :30 (Supp. 1969); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-8.1 to -8.7 (Supp. 1969-70); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-9-12
to -16 (1968); N.Y. PEN. LAW § 483-d (McKinney 1967); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 8-53.1, 14-318.2, 14-318.2, 14-318.3 (1969); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 50-25-01
to -05 (Supp. 1969); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Supp. 1969); OICLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 846-48 (Supp. 1969-70); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 146.710-
.990 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330 (Supp. 1970); R.I. GMr. LAWS
ANN. §§ 40-13.1-1 to -6 (Supp. 1969); Tsmx. Cons ANN. §§ 37-1201 to -1207
(Supp. 1969); Tsx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 695c-2, §§ 1-4 (Supp. 1969-70);
UTAH COD ANN. §§ 55-16-1 to -6 (Supp. 1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§§ 1351-55 (Supp. 1969); VA. ConE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 171-76 (Supp. 1970);
WASH. Rsv. COD ANN. §§ 26.44.010 to -.060 (Supp. 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 48.981 (Supp. 1969); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-28.1 to -28.6 (1965). An
extensive review of the reporting laws has been made elsewhere and will
not be attempted here. Reporting Laws, supra note 31.
120. E.g., CAL. PEN. COD § 11161.5 (West 1970) grants immunity from
any civil or criminal liability to physicians for making an authorized re-
port.
121. E.g., Id. § 11161.5 also stipulates that the physician shall make the
report by telephone and in writing to the local police authority (the head
of the police department, sheriff, district attorney) and the juvenile pro-
bation department.
122. ALA. COns tit. 27, § 23 (Cum. Supp. 1969); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-13-6 (1963); Mn. ANN. COnE art. 27, § 11A(g) (1967) grant immunity
from civil and criminal liability for participating in judicial proceedings
subsequent to reporting. But see CAL. PEN. Cons § 11161.5 (West Supp.
1970), does not extend immunity to liability which might result from par-
ticipation in judicial proceedings.
123. Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, The
Abused Child-Principles and Suggested Language for Legislation on Re-
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been the guidelines for the mandatory and permissive statutes124
adopted by the state legislatures.
The model statute of the Children's Bureau, which has been used
extensively by state legislatures, covers (1) the purpose of the act
(to protect the health and welfare of physically abused children
and to prevent further abuses by having physicians report to a
police authority and causing state protective services to be imple-
mented); (2) reports by physicians and institutions (required when
injuries do not appear to be caused accidentally); (3) nature and
content of report and to whom made (oral report to be made im-
mediately and written report to follow); (4) immunity from civil
or criminal liability for reporting; (5) evidence not to be excluded
(due to physician-patient or husband-wife privilege); and (6) pen-
alty (a misdemeanor) for a knowing and willful violation of failure
to report.
125
The rationale behind the model statutes is that a report must be
filed by a person who possesses the skill and judgment necessary for
recognizing a case of abuse; the persons most appropriate for ful-
filling this function are physicians. Because physicians are reluc-
tant to report their suspicions, they need support from legal insti-
tutions and the laws. Too, a report of a suspected case of abuse
must be filed before the legal authorities and social welfare agencies
can identify a case of abuse and apply their methods for alleviating
the condition. Such laws have been needed to help overcome the
unwillingness of physicians and directors of hospitals to disclose
their knowledge and suspicions of possible child abuse cases to ap-
propriate authorities.
A question has been raised by the American Medical Association
porting of the Physically Abused Child (1963) [hereinafter cited as Sug-
gested Reporting Legislation]; 24 Committee of State Officials on Suggested
State Legislation, Council of State Governments, Suggested State Legislation
(1965); Children's Division, Am. Humane Ass'n, Guidelines for Legislation
to Protect the Battered Child (1963); Am. Medical Ass'n, Physical Abuse
of Children-Suggested Legislation (1965) [hereinafter cited as A.M.A.
Suggested Legislation].
124. The mandatory statute requires reporting and thus grants immunity
from legal liability for reporting. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 11161.5 (West
Supp. 1970). The permissive one provides immunity from legal liability
for reporting but does not require reporting. E.g., N.M. STAT. A1,M. § 13-
9-13 (1967); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 695c-2, § 2(a) (Supp. 1970-71);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.030 (Supp. 1970).
125. Suggested Reporting Legislation, supra note 123.
as to whether physicians as a group should be solely identified as
having an obligation to report injuries or whether other groups
should be similarly required. The problem posed by the Associa-
tion is that if doctors are publicized as having a unique duty
to report, parents may be more deterred from seeking medical at-
tention for their child than if other kinds of persons also are re-
quired to similarly report their suspicions. 1 26 The opposing argu-
ment 27 is that if a duty to report falls upon an indefinitely large
group, the impact of the requirement may become diffused so that
neither a physician nor any other person may feel as though the
duty applies to him. Predominantly, the law is designed to aid the
physician in resolving his special professional problems 1 28 concern-
ing reporting rather than to alleviate his duty to report.
In jurisdictions with statutes which carry a criminal sanction
for the physician who fails to report, the physician may be civilly
liable for not reporting if his inaction had deprived the child of pro-
tective services and thus substantially led to subsequent injuries
which were inflicted by the youth's caretakers. Behavior, which
flagrantly and unexcusedly violates a criminal statute designed to
protect a child from harm, may subject the actor (physician) to
civil liability in an action brought by the child. 20
The need to establish that the physician's omission to act is a
proximate cause of the child's injuries remains, and a test case of
this type of action has yet to appear. Assuming that his family is
socially alienated and lacks personal and social relationships with
the community, the child, who has been so abused, must bring the
case before legal and judicial authorities and due to the very nature
of his problem (young age, physically abused, unreported to pro-
tective agencies which might act in his behalf), tends to be in no
position to do so. If the battering of the child is known, however,
it is possible that in the future an entrusted relative or other re-
sponsible person may bring a civil action for the benefit of the child.
The argument has been advanced that a reporting statute should
126. A.M.A. Suggested Legislation, supra note 123, at 1.
127. Reporting Laws, supra note 31, at 6.
128. Le., the reasoning is that if the physician is legally required to re-
port cases, his reluctance to report based on fear of legal liability for exer-
cising his professional judgment (that the child is battered) or recrimina-
tions for not respecting a confidential relationship to a patient (when
viewed in terms of the parent rather than the child as patient) will be over-
come.
129. Reporting Laws, supra note 31, at 35. See also 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, ToRTs § 17.6 (1965); PRossE , supra note 74, § 35; Morris, The Role
of Criminal Statutes in Negligence Actions, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 21 (1949).
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not have a penalty clause since the identification of the battered
child depends upon competent persons exercising their judgment
and discretion, and such a provision is practically unenforceable. 130
Also, physicians have objected to the establishment of penal sanc-
tions because the suggestion that criminal measures must be taken
to "ensure that they do their duty impugns their integrity as pro-
fessional persons."131
Mandatory reporting legislation is not considered a panacea by
many persons concerned with child abuse.132 The Attorney-Gen-
eral of Kansas has advised that such legislation would be redun-
dant. 3 3 His reasons were that a physician was already obligated
to report cases of child abuse according to the law in Kansas, 34 the
only person who could claim the physician-patient privilege would
be the child, and the physician would not be personally liable if
he rendered and reported only his medical opinion.'35
Another difficulty with reporting laws is that the parent who has
been reported is likely to feel accused and affronted by being re-
ported, 36 and if reunited with the child may release these feelings
against the child. Alternatively, and perhaps idealistically, how-
ever, the parent who has been rehabilitated and reunited will seek
to develop a new and positive relationship with his child.
Regardless of the drawbacks which are involved with reporting
statutes, the need remains to alleviate the bases for the unwilling-
ness of physicians to report. The medical practictioners are most
able to detect possible instances of battering, particularly those
hidden to the layman. Before social and legal institutions have the
opportunity to correct and improve the home environments of
abused children, the children must be identified. The objective of a
reporting statute is not to "enlarge the potential for case finding,
nor to articulate a moral duty, but to spur reporting and, hence,
actual case finding."'' 37 Since medical practitioners often do not
130. Shepherd, supra note 63, at 192.
131. Reporting Laws, supra note 31, at 9.
132. Shepherd, supra note 63, at 193.
133. Ferguson, Battered Child Syndrome, 65 J. KAN. MEDicA Soc'Y
67 (1964).
134. KA. STAT. ANN. § 38-717 (Supp. 1969).
135. Id. § 38-718.
136. Reinhart & Elmer, The Abused Child, 188 J.A.M.A. 358, 360 (1964).
137. Legal Framework, supra note 86, at 5.
report many of the battered children they treat3 8 any legal means
for encouraging and persuading them to report will have a signi-
ficant effect, whether measured in terms of actual increases in
cases reported,'3 9 or greater awareness of the problem by educat-
ing physicians of the potential existence of child abuse.
140
Central Registries
After suspected child abuse cases have been reported to the ap-
propriate agency, the information may be recorded in a central
agency or registry in several states.14 1 While a central registry has
been considered to have several important objectives, implicit in
some of the objectives are also drawbacks and problems. If a file
is set up without express legislative authorization, it violates stat-
utes which provide for the confidentiality of certain kinds of of-
ficial health and welfare data. Wisconsin, for example, overcame
this problem by approving a registry that allowed for only those
who, by law, were required or licensed to provide for the welfare of
children, to obtain its information, except by order of the court.
42
However, even with this legislative proviso, the author questions
whether such files of a registry would ever be maintained in the
strictest confidentiality, no more than are juvenile records which
wind up in the hands of potential employers.
Since abusing parents usually do not return their injured child
to the same doctor or hospital,'143 a central registry which covers
a wide geographical range may reduce the possibility that parents
may be able to hide the situation. The doctor treating a current
physical ailment of a child, who he has not previously examined
and for whom he has no medical history, may be hesitant about
138. See McCoid, supra note 19, at 19 n.51, 36.
139. See Reporting Laws, supra note 31, at 37-54; Legal Framework,
supra note 86, at 715-16; for discussion of the frequency of reports of child
abuse following the enactment of reporting statutes in various states.
140. McCoid, supra note 19, at 37.
141. E.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 11A (Supp. 1969); CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 11161.5 (West 1970) (all written reports received by a law enforcement
agency are forwarded to the State Bureau of Criminal Identification and
Investigation); C.L. PEN. CODE § 11110 (West 1970) (Bureau main-
tains records of reports which are available to any physician, probation
department or child protective agency and which are subsequently trans-
mitted to the city police department, sheriff, or district attorney when con-
cerning the same minor or minors of the same family in a current report).
See Reporting Laws, supra note 31, at 24-31, for an excellent discussion
of the purposes and legislative and administrative origins of registries in
several states.
142. Wis. STAT. ANx. § 48.78 (1957) (relating to confidentiality of rec-
ords).
143. Cal. Report on Child Abuse, supra note 30, at 73.
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forming an opinion that the child is battered. At the point of de-
ciding whether present injuries are reasonably indicative of abuse
and non-accidentally inflicted, the registry information of the ex-
istence and relative severity of previous incidents of suspected
abuse may help him. The information available in a central regis-
try also may aid a court or child protective worker in evaluating
the degree to which the child is endangered by remaining with
his parents, or whether protective services may be adequate. The
drawback with this type of use is that it may be unfair to the par-
ents. While a previous report may provide some basis for concern
that the present injury is a case of abuse, the physician may be un-
duly influenced by the report. When the central registry is the
type which records instances of suspicions of possible abuse but
the reporter's firmness of opinion is considered insufficient to jus-
tify a community response or an investigation, the danger is en-
larged. Two questioning opinions of possible abuse may lead to the
forming of a reasonable belief which can cause a public agency to
investigate and invade the privacy of a family. When the deter-
mination to make such an investigation is finally made, the amount
of circumstantial evidence provided in the registry is more than suf-
ficient to merit the intrusion. On opposite sides of the scale of this
conditional intrusion into the parent's privacy is the life or the limb
of the child. It is unlikely that judicial wisdom would not read into
the registry's statutory authority a valid police power purpose (that
is, for the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens, in this case chil-
dren), but it is advisable for statutes to contain a statement
of purpose so that legislative intent need not be researched or
theorized.
A problem also arises when names contained in the registry are
not removed when abuse is found not to have occurred. Unjusti-
fied loss of reputation may follow the placing of a name in a regis-
try, especially when there is no assurance that only authorized per-
sons will have access to the files. A suggestion by the Committee
on the Infant and Pre-School Child of the American Academy of
Pediatrics is that all reports should be temporarily filed and then
placed in a permanent file only when suspicions have been factually
confirmed.
1 44
144. Comm. on Infant & Pre-School Child. Am. Academy of Pediatrics,
Maltreatment of Children: The Physically Abused Child, 37 PErm.uacs
377, 380 (1966).
Depending on the information reported, a registry may provide
important facts for studies dealing with the prevention and man-
agement of child abuse cases.145 Central registries which are ad-
ministratively set up for statistical purposes have been considered
to be the only type which do not raise sensitive issues of privacy, 140
since they have no reason to record family identities.
Protective Agencies
The main difficulty with the types of legislation discussed in pre-
ceding sections is that they do not, in themselves, lead to the de-
sired protection and alleviation of the problems of the abused child
in a practical sense. The Children's Bureau Model Act suggests
that reports of suspected cases of child abuse be made to police or
other law enforcement authorities,1 47 and several states have
adopted its recommendations.'48 The rationale for this position has
been that law enforcement authorities may be expected to make
needed investigations to determine the source of the reported phy-
sical injuries, and because they are found in all states and are avail-
able at all times of the day, law enforcement agencies provide a cer-
tain element of uniformity to the enforcement of child abuse
legislation throughout the nation. 49 However physicians may be
more reluctant to report to law enforcement authorities than to
welfare agencies or child-protective societies, preferring rehabili-
tation and prevention over the penal alternatives of the law.'5 °
Although the police are trained to investigate and appear to be
the appropriate agency to receive reports, the effectiveness of its
145. E.g., knowledge that abused children fall within a certain age range
and may tend to be of one sex and that the parents may have certain
psychological or social characteristics may make the physician more aware
of possible cases of child abuse, and make prevention more effective if the
information can be utilized so as to set up needed services to such parents
who are characterized by the more probable attributes, to alleviate the pre-
disposing factors.
146. Reporting Laws, supra note 31, at 30-31.
147. Suggested Reporting Legislation, supra note 123, at 8.
148. E.g., ARm. REv. STAT. AiN. § 13-842.01A (Supp. 1969-70); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:403B (Supp. 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § l1A (Supp.
1969); Onto REv. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Supp. 1969).
See McCoid, supra note 19, at 51-56, for a discussion of various state
statutes concerning the person or agency to whom child abuse reports
are made.
149. McCoid, supra note 19, at 51-52. See also Suggested Reporting
Legislation, supra note 123, at 8-9; Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health,
Educ. & Welfare, Report of Meeting on Physical Abuse of Infants and
Young Children 3, 6 (Jan. 15, 1962).
150. McCoid, supra note 19, at 51, 55-56. See also tenBensel & Raile,
The Battered Child Syndrome, 46 MINN. MEDICINE 977, 981 (1963).
The Battered Child
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
officers may be limited due to the unique problems involved in
child abuse cases. The police investigation is likely to be oriented
more toward punishment than the invocation of protective social
services, and the presence of a police officer may escalate the fears
of the parents to such an extent that they will not be able to co-
operate in trying to improve their child's environment.151 The in-
vestigating person is faced with important decisions concerning the
course of action which should be followed' 52 and needs to be skilled
and experienced in working with families in difficulty.15 One le-
gal authority has thus concluded that reports should be sent to
child welfare rather than law enforcement agencies as soon as child
protective services of reasonable quality are available, and that the
responsibilities of the social welfare investigators ought to be
clearly delineated by statute.
54
Statutory provisions'55 to resolve the practical problems of treat-
ment' 50 often establish a child protective service which deals with
situations in which a child is reported to be abused by parents or
others responsible for his care and may include both casework ser-
vice and the initiation of legal action to remove the child from the
home,157 or it may be primarily a casework service activated by an
agency on a report of knowledge of abuse of children, carrying legal
authority and focusing on parental function in relation to the child
care. 158 The duty of the agency responsible for the child welfare
program, as suggested by the Children's Bureau 59 is to investigate
151. Reporting Laws, supra note 31, at 44.
152. E.g., sending the case to juvenile court, removing the child from the
home, leaving the child in the hospital, handling the specific family prob-
lems.
153. DeFrancis, The Battered Child-A Role for the Juvenile Court, the
Legislature and the Child Welfare Agency, Juv. CT. JUDGES J. 27, 29
(Summer 1963).
154. Reporting Laws, supra note 31, at 45, 46.
155. See Legal Framework, supra note 86, at 704-07, for a discussion of
the variable statutory patterns for offering child protective services.
156. See Reporting Laws, supra note 31, at 41-43, for a discussion of the
"practical operations of agencies and institutions under the law which give
life to the purpose of the reporting statutes or destroy them."
157. Jeter, Children's Problems and Services in Child Welfare Programs
73 (Children's Bureau 1963).
158. Bishop, Introduction to Am. Humane Ass'n, AN INTENSIVE CASEWORK
PROJECT IN CHiD PROTECTrV SERVICES 3 (undated).
159. Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Proposals
for Drafting, Principles and Suggested Language for Legislation of Public
Child Welfare and Youth Services 29 (1957).
reports of suspected cases of child abuse, and following the investi-
gation either offer appropriate social services to the parents or
others in loco parentis, or notify a law enforcement agency, an ap-
propriate court, or another community agency.
Since leaving the child with his parents is preferable to removing
him from their custody, it is important for a trained social worker
to investigate the feasibility and effectiveness of retaining the child
in his home and conducting casework; casework with battering par-
ents, however, is an intensive, difficult process, requiring special-
ized knowledge.16 0 While it provides an effective means for cor-
recting some child abuse cases, most such counseling experiences
have not been successsful. 16 When leaving the child with his par-
ents would involve a high probability of further abuse of the child,
removal of the child from the home is often deemed advisable.
Probably the least attractive alternative is the prosecution of the
pa'rents.1 62
The objective of offering protective services to parents and chil-
dren is to change and improve the family situation, relationships,
and problems, to
... bring about a change in behavior; in attitudes about the treat-
ment of children . . . ; about responsibility . . . toward physical,
medical or emotional needs of the family so that warmer, happier
and more secure bonds are formed between the parents as indi-
viduals and their children, so that improvement is brought about
in the physical and environmental side of their home life.163
An important point about the offer of protective service of the
social agency is that it is not passive; upon receiving a report of
abuse and prior to court action, the agency contacts the parents.
Since the danger of coercion and the invasion of a family's privacy
exists, certain legal safeguards are necessary. Legislation should
clearly delineate the authority of the agency and the factual cir-
cumstances justifying an offer of service, so as to prevent the un-
constitutional invasion of privacy. The right to consultation with
counsel should be available to the parents when services are of-
fered, provided at public expense if necessary, to evaluate the rea-
sons for intervention by the agency. Also, judicial determination
of the propriety of the offering of protective services is appropriate
since the procedure involves questioning of witnesses and scruti-
nizing evidence so as to determine the necessity of providing ade-
160. California Approach, supra note 1, at 1826.
161. See id. at 1826 n.83.
162. Id. at 1826.
163. V. DeFrancis, Child Protective Services in the United States 11
(Children's Division, Am. Humane Ass'n 1956).
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quate protection for the child and insuring the rights of the par-
ents.164 The requirement of Due Process'6 5 would seem to com-
mand these safeguards.
NEEDED REFORm OF THE LAW
There are numerous alternative solutions to the problems pre-
viously discussed and many suggested solutions have been made by
other writers.'6 6  One alternative is to make the laws stricter in
terms of the sanctions against parents who have abused their chil-
dren, but this would not alleviate the underlying causes of the prob-
lem. Parents would only be motivated to hide their battered
child so that no reports would be made until the child was beyond
medical help, if then. If the parent were heavily fined or jailed,
the family resources would be depleted, and/or the parents might
feel angrier and more aggressive toward the child. Assuming that
the parent's behavior was previously motivated by some underlying
unresolved personal conflict which provoked aggressiveness to-
ward the child, the parent who had been punished because of his
relationship with his child might later feel as though he was com-
pletely justified in taking out his angers on the child with physical
beatings and abuse; in this sense society in effect would be pro-
viding the parent with a justification for beating the child. The
parent might not feel a need to make restitution or make up to his
child in any other way, as he might feel that society's sanctions had
accomplished this. The relationship between the child and parent
thus could not be expected to improve and would probably deterio-
rate further.
Another alternative is to remove the legal sanctions against the
parent and thereby eliminate any legal source of contention be-
tween parent and child. This may not be feasible, however, as re-
moving the influence and authority of the law from the intra-fa-
164. Legal Framework, supra note 86, at 708-10.
165. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
166. See e.g., California Approach, supra note 1, at 1828-30, for discus-
sion of the recommendation that primary responsibility be placed tenta-
tively with a special unit in county welfare departments on a pilot or
small study basis; The Abused Child, supra note 22, at 152-60, for a pro-
posed draft of legislation to overcome the "apathetic attitude" in medical
and legal professions concerning the child abuse problem and the "psychia-
tric dilemma of the parent."
milial relationships which are threatening the security, well-being,
and life of the child would be removing the sole source of protec-
tion the child might have. Thus a need remains to maintain the
provisions of reporting statutes which require physicians to report
suspected cases of abuse.
A question remains, however, whether criminal statutes which
specifically apply to abusive parent-child relationships should be
maintained, and whether the criminal codes which apply to cases of
assault and battery should apply to child abuse. The difficulties
of prosecuting parents under criminal cruelty to children statutes
have been discussed in a preceding section. The problems with as-
sault and battery prosecutions are also unresolved issues due to the
fact that the realm of a parent's authority extends to punishment,
and the acts of punishment and their physical and mental effects on
the child may meet all of the necessary elements of the crimes
except perhaps the mens rea.167 The issue is unresolved, however,
not because mens rea is difficult to establish, but because the par-
ents have the responsibility of raising their children, providing
for their education and physical and moral well-being, and may
even be considered to have the duty to punish and apply physical
restraints on their children so as to meet the requirements of their
task. Thus it would appear that the physical treatment of chil-
dren by their parents (except in the extreme effect of death) should
not, as a matter of social policy, fall within the realm of criminal
law. By its recognition that assault and battery are crimes, the
criminal law tends to imply that children should not learn partly
be means of fear of physical punishment 68 administered by their
caretakers for their disapproved behaviors, or alternatively that
parents should be hesitant about punishing their children for what
they consider wrongdoings. This reasoning may be particularly
valid as the parent, who is normally loving and controlled and
whose actions are not characteristic of the abusing parent, may be-
come intensely angry and show his anger by a severe physical beat-
ing when the child has performed acts which are grossly distaste-
ful to the parent; the parent's intention may very well include
hurting 69 the child due to his own anger although it may be tem-
167. Mens rea is difficult to establish when the acts occur in the privacy
of the home as the child is too young to testify against his parents and no
other witnesses are available. However, mens rea may be established by
circumstantial evidence alone.
168. The use of the term physical punishment here is meant to imply the
kinds of actions involved in spankings as well as physical isolation.
169. Hurting in this sense is limited to pain and discomfort and is not
meant to imply a permanent physical injury.
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pered by the further purpose of teaching the child never to repeat
the act. The criminal law is not designed to prevent parents from
conveying their system of values to their children according to the
means they deem most efficacious. When the criminal law is ap-
plied to parent-child relationships, the objectives of the criminal
law (for example, retribution, prevention of assault and battery)
may conflict with the objectives of parental punishment techniques
(for example, teaching, guiding, controlling, caring). Thus the
criminal law may not provide an appropriate frame of reference
for evaluating parent-child relationships.
The problem with the handling of battered child cases by the
juvenile court system in regards to providing adequate evidence
has been discussed in a former section. (See text accompany-
ing note 102, supra). Too, the child who becomes a dependent of
the juvenile court often develops a negative social reputation which
is similar to that applied to delinquents who have received disci-
plinary/penal treatment from the same juvenile court. If the juve-
nile court orders the family life of the child to be supervised so as to
maintain the child in the home, usually a probation officer is
charged with responsibility for the supervision. The probation
staff is actually very poorly trained for this kind of work 70 and
may apply quite inappropriate techniques to the problems of paren-
tal behavior; rather, the staff is more experienced with handling
juvenile problems. While this problem might be solved through
specialized training, perhaps the orientation of the staff toward ju-
venile rather than adult behavior would not be overcome com-
pletely.
The question as to the appropriate agency and professionally
trained persons for handling battered child situations has remained
unanswered. The basic cause of the battered child has been found
to be the parent's behavior and state of mind, not the behavior of
the child. Presumably the parent needs help in coping with his
personal adjustment problems since he is not able to solve them by
himself within his family context. Intervention by a trained pro-
fessional person such as a psychiatrist or psychologist provides
an appropriate avenue for exploration of possible solutions to the
existing problems. The type of work and analysis performed by
170. Interview with Robert McCambridge, Counselor, San Diego Con-
ciliation Court, in San Diego, Cal., Feb. 1970.
a social worker may prove effective in some cases but does not en-
list the voluntary support or approval of the parents; in most in-
stances the reported reaction of parents has been resentment.
A possibility, which has not been considered specifically' 7 ' is to
place suspected cases of child abuse under the ambit of Concilia-
tion Courts.172 Superficially, at least, the title of the court im-
plies that a problem between persons exists and that there is a
desire to solve the problem and reconcile the differences. If the
parents do not care to assume their responsibilities for their bat-
tered child, no implication is intended that the state would not
assume its duty to find another place for the child to live nor re-
quire the parents to maintain custody of their child. But, assuming
that the parents want to retain control of their child, they may be
motivated to improve their relationship with the child. The work
of the Conciliation Court in San Diego, California, has been very
adept in helping marriages in trouble by helping the individuals
resolve their conflicts and problems by a decision in favor of either
conciliation or dissolution of their marriage.17 3  The point is that
Conciliation Court counselors are trained in working with and
handling problems of a personal adult nature, often involving un-
resolved conflicts, and capable of developing and testing tech-
niques suitable to solving the problems of family relationships.
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Under this proposal the court would continue to be active in
making the discretionary decisions concerning the adjudication and
handling of child abuse cases, and thus would gain several advan-
tages. One would be the viable alternative of making the help of
the Conciliation Court available to the parents. If the facts of a
case indicated that the child may be presently retained in the home
without danger to his life, the judge could allow the child to re-
171. In California the proposal to establish a statewide family court to
have full jurisdiction over all matters relating to the family, including bat-
tered child cases, was rejected by the legislature. Cal. Assembly Comm.
on Judiciary, Report on Assembly Bill No. 530 and Senate Bill No. 252,
Report of 1969 Divorce Reform Legislation 2 (Assembly Daily J., Aug. 8,
1969); Report of the Cal. Governor's Commission on the Family (Dec. 15,
1966). But see N.Y. FAILY CT. ACT §§ 1011-25 (McKinney Supp. 1969-70),
which places child abuse cases under the jurisdiction of family courts.
172. Ganley, Henry, & Porteus, Divorce, Law and Psychology, 7 HAWA1U
B.J. § 6 (Oct. 1970) [hereinafter cited as Ganley]. Conciliation Courts
have been set up since 1939 in several counties in California, with the pur-
pose of assisting married residents who find themselves in a crisis situation
which is threatening the stability of their marriage. Super. Ct. of San
Diego, Cal., The Conciliation Court of San Diego County 7-11 (2d ed. Dec.
1966).
173. Super. Ct. of San Diego, Cal., The Conciliation Court of San Diego
County 9 (2d ed. Dec. 1966).
174. Id. at 14-17; see Ganley, supra note 172.
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main in the home and order the parent to meet with a Concilia-
tion Court counselor with the purpose of helping the parent to im-
prove his relationship with the child, of understanding the reasons
for his previously abusive behavior toward the child, and of find-
ing ways to effect a beginning to a warm relationship with his
child. If the safety of the child was deemed endangered by remain-
ing in the home, the child could be placed in a foster home or insti-
tution for child care until the parents had worked with the coun-
selors and decided whether or not they wanted to provide a positive,
non-abusive environment for their battered child. The ultimate
goal would be the resolution of the parent's personal adjustment
conflicts so that he could decide if he wanted to maintain custody
of his child, and hopefully the reconciliation of the natural parent
and his child.
While this suggestion resolves the problems of handling battered
child cases with criminal statutes and juvenile court acts, it does
not solve the problem of who the proper person is to submit the ini-
tial report. Since physicians have been considered to be reluctant
to report their suspicions to the police, their hesitation might be
overcome if they were to report to counselors of the Conciliation
Court. By their title and training, counselors would be expected to
offer remedial assistance rather than penal sanctions. The counse-
lor would need to have the same authority as that of a police or
probation officeri 7m to remove a child from his home in order to
meet the possible need for temporary removal due to apparent im-
minent danger to the child's life when the Conciliation Court was
not available. While the response of parents to the intervention
of a police officer might be influenced by any previous associations
they have had with the police, their response to a counselor might
be more open and flexible and considerably less prompted by fear.
Thus, if child abuse cases were handled by Conciliation Courts
and their counselors, the hesitation of physicians about reporting
suspected cases of battered children might be overcome, and the
treatment of the parents or abusers of the children could be geared
toward remediation and correction rather than penal punishment or
removal of the child from the home.
A few other effects might also follow. One drawback is that
175. See e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST'N CODE §§ 584, 600, 625 (West 1970).
the Conciliation Court would have to be expanded. State funds
would have to be allocated to provide the community with a new
combined legal and psychological service to solve a problem for
which valid and reliable statistics concerning its frequency of oc-
curence are not available. Also, the counselors would need to in-
vestigate and analyze the attendant problems of abusive parent-
child situations and develop effective means for coping with them
and helping the abusive parents overcome these problems.
This discussion is not meant to imply that the task of the coun-
selors of the Conciliation Court would not be great and difficult.
While the problems of the battered child situation may be consid-
ered to have been caused primarily by the parent's behavior and
psychological difficulties, the patterns of his behavior may be ex-
pected to have evoked certain patterns of behavior on the part of
the child, which interact and feed upon the parent's abuse and
which may cause psychological adjustment problems in the child.
The problems will not, therefore, be solely limited to how the par-
ent behaves but will also involve restructuring the behavior pat-
terns of the child which provoke abuse and working with the emo-
tional conflicts and psychological problems which the abused child
may hold.
176
Another possibility is that enactment of this proposal might lead
to greater socialism by the extension of the state into the health,
welfare, and safety of the child. That is, considering that the par-
ent may have ambivalent feelings toward the child he is battering,
conceivably once the parent has considered his feelings and their
cause without fear of penal sanctions in the context of a profes-
sional counseling relationship, he may decide that he actually does
not want to maintain custody and control of the child; in this case
the state would be obligated to assume contr.ol and custody of the
child and find an appropriate way of caring for his needs. Too, if
the child abuse is handled by the law according to a non-penally
oriented system, some tensions caused by the law might be eased;
loss of child custody in such a situation might be a psychologically,
emotionally easier event, and might even involve less social ostra-
cism, in which case the state's burden of economically, educationally,
and socially providing for the unwanted child in a suitable manner
would probably increase. There is no way of knowing, however,
if the number of parents who voluntarily would choose to relin-
quish custody of their children would be greater than the number
of whom have their rights to custody served by the courts due to a
176. Interview with B.D. Porteus, Ph.D., Research Psychologist, in San
Diego, Cal., Sept. 15, 1970.
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determination that the child's health and well-being are endangered
by remaining in the home. Any increase of wards of the state
should be more than compensated by the advantage of the possi-
bility of a surviving battered child taking his place in society suf-
ficiently adaptable not to be an antisocial, economic, and parasitic
burden on society and the state. The primary advantage in it-
self, however, would be the potentiality of changing the child's
abusive home environment, which is threatening his health and
well-being, to one with nurturant relationships which would pro-
vide for his optimal physical, emotional, and mental development.
If the above legal reforms would only prove to be partially success-
ful then that aspect of the law dealing with the battered child
would have found some degree of logic.
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